Genetic Engineering in Humans Essay

?Genetic Engineering in Humans: How the concerns of the past shape our thoughts for the future It is human nature to be fascinated by the unknown, to conceive radical ideas and to use humanity’s undying curiosity to fuel investigation into areas which previously were a mystery. Genetic engineering in humans is one such example of a field whose idea emerged countless generations ago and intrigued the likes of many scientists, philosophers and writers, throughout history. However not until the technological revolution of the twentieth century, did the research and ethical debate on this subject begin to take a more practical perspective, as the tools necessary to study the intricacies of living structures were developed. The concept of genetic engineering has sparked an ongoing debate regarding the bioethical concerns of this field, which focus strongly on the ethics involved in tampering with the work of Mother Nature and its possible consequences. However this has not been a topic for scientists alone. Throughout history, the minds of fictional literature have provided countless examples of a genetically engineered world; in several cases presenting a dystopian rendition of society, a clear symbol of what they believe to be the consequence of human intervention with the natural discourse of nature. The ethical issues surrounding human genetic engineering, such as genetic discrimination, a loss of human autonomy and the more profound concepts which threaten to redefine what it means to be a human, have universal value, paralleling the concerns of today. This suggests the paramount significance of exploring ethical issues and the consequences of human genetic engineering, as history implies that such concepts will continue to resonate through time. This essay will examine how the literary texts of the past have helped shape our ethical perspective on genetic engineering today. In essence genetic engineering is the manipulation of an organism’s hereditary material [1]. The goal in creating such genetically altered beings is not only to eradicate disease, but to create a population which carries only the most desirable physical and behavioural traits and has the ability to pass on such traits to future generations [3]. However the treatment of diseases does not create public anxiety, rather it is the concept of eugenics and gene determinism. Eugenics is essentially ‘any attempt to accelerate human evolution by improving the genetic makeup of humans† [1]. Eugenics however cannot succeed unless society accepts some degree of the genetic determinism ideology which perceives that all individuals are â€Å"inevitable consequences of the biochemical properties of their cells† and so their â€Å"characteristics are uniquely determined by the constituents of their genes† [1]. Ethically this theory seeks to disregard the true essence of human self definition and integrity, eliminating the significance of such immaterial characteristics as self awareness, will power and human spirit. Additionally, an ethical problem surrounding eugenics is that it is human directed evolution, where individuals set the course of evolution depending on chosen ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ traits. As philosopher Jurgen Habermas states â€Å"it seems reasonable to allow this in the case of a purely preventive intervention in order to avert diseases (â€Å"negative eugenics†). It becomes questionable, however, when it is a case of fitting out a child with certain desirable characteristic (â€Å"positive eugenics†) [1]. This statement alludes to several ethical dilemmas which can arise from a society thriving on the application of positive eugenics. From a virtue ethics standpoint, the application of positive eugenics suggests that the accessibility of genetic manipulation will be limited to those parents who can afford it, thus creating discrimination between sectors of society. If a technology is available to eliminate disease and achieve a â€Å"better† quality of life, should it not be available to all individuals in so to create an egalitarian society which is indiscriminate? Furthermore, how does the implications of such a technology impact upon the individuals sense of privacy and individualism? A world of positive eugenics would suggest an adoption of the gene determinist theory which proposes that all traits and behaviour are ingrained within our genes and thus are not influenced by any other external factors. In such a world, genetic analysis would be open, rendering a complete breakdown of the moral boundaries which hide our genetic makeup from the outside world. People could be tested, controlled and manipulated when access of their hereditary material is in the hands of others, violating their right to privacy. George Wald offers one view of the ethical debate stating that, â€Å"[genetic engineering] faces our society with problems unprecedented†¦ It places in human hands the capacity to redesign living organisms†¦ It presents probably the largest ethical problem that science has ever had to face† [7]. However scientist James D. Watson claims that â€Å"until a tiger devours you, you don’t know that the jungle is dangerous† [7]. In essence, there is a conflict of interest between the possibility of eradicating life threatening diseases and the ethical consequences which may arise from using the technology to alter the evolutionary process for mankind’s own benefit. As a society we must see this as a cost-benefit analysis, where we weigh the proposed advantages of genetic engineering against the possible and in many cases unforseen, consequences. Profoundly the main issue is of self-definition. From an ethical perspective, the true essence of human nature is challenged by the proposed applications of genetic engineering. With these ethical issues in mind, we can see that certain measures must be taken to contain the ethical consequences of genetic engineering to a manageable level and not let the technology overcome our sense of self, compassion and humanity. This will only be successful however, if the key issues are examined prior to genetic engineering becoming mainstream, as when such technology is unleashed to the public it cannot be uninvented. Therefore those in the field of science and engineering must ensure that their research and experimentation adheres to all regulations outlined in the Code of Ethics. Engineering practitioners must â€Å"act on the basis of a well informed conscience† [8] as well as â€Å"respect the dignity of all persons† [8] when carrying out research and experimentation. When faced with unique bioethical concerns emerging from previously uncharted areas of technology, society turns to the scientists and engineers to offer their technocratic decision regarding the new concept. This is the case presently faced by genetic engineering. The engineer in this situation becomes a model of a guardian, social servant and social enabler to humanity, who not only predicts the direction this field will take in the future, but analyses the potential consequences of genetic engineering and helps society to understand its own needs and develop moral autonomy. In this way the engineer is governed by strict ethical codes to â€Å"be honest and trustworthy† [8] as well as â€Å"practise engineering to foster the health, safety and wellbeing of the community and the environment† [8] as well as other stakeholders involved. It can be useful to explore such notions in literature, where the scientist or engineer has experimented without considering the potential consequences of their actions, resulting in an imbalance of the natural order of life. Such is the case in Mary Shelly’s ‘Frankenstein’, where the experimenter did not â€Å"act on the basis of adequate knowledge† [8] as the Code of Ethics outlines, but instead allowed human curiosity to rule, tampering with inanimate organisms to produce new a life form. The strong ethical dilemma posed by this novel is that when such organisms are created what are their rights and how do we determine their humanity? The situation developed in Frankenstein is one of blind sightedness, where the unforeseen consequences of the social experimentation are so detrimental to society that they eventually become the undoing of the experimenter. The text explores the ethical ideas that society should uphold certain virtues when dealing with Mother Nature and that the organisms we alter have certain rights just like other member of society. Most significantly however, it highlights how important the duty of the engineer is to society; to warn and to educate on the possible consequences of new technology and application. The Frankenstein story warns us that the time to address the ethical implications of genetic engineering is before we actually apply it [1]. Furthermore, science fiction literature provides an interesting insight into how the world has perceived genetic engineering and its consequences in a social and cultural sense. The idea of direct genetic control for the â€Å"betterment† of humanity started with evolutionary geneticist, J. B. S. Haldane’s book ‘Daedalus’, in 1924 [1]. The ethical consequences of genetic engineering are explored extensively in texts such as Andrew Niccol’s movie Gattaca (1997) and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932). Haldane’s vision is sharply satirized in these texts, reflective of the view society had taken after the fall of the eugenics movement in the 1930s. These texts are significant in our understanding of what might happen to society through gene determinism and the absolute acceptance and application of genetic engineering, as scientists at the Gene Therapy Policy Conference in 1997 â€Å"concluded that the possibilities [of germ line gene therapy] aren’t entirely in the realm of science fiction† [1]. Furthermore, the ethical issues discussed in these texts are repetitive, although being from different time periods. This suggests the significance and universality of the ethical risks associated with genetic engineering. The movie Gattaca released in 1997 is a bioethical text which explores the societal implications of genetic-determinism and genetic engineering and gives light to the consequences which may occur from new eugenics. Gattaca raises the issue that many problems associated with the new eugenics, such as genetic discrimination, genetic prophecy, and the homogenization of society [1] is not due to the technology itself, but instead these problems arise only if society accepts the belief that individuals are no more than the sum of their genes. In essence it challenges the notion of genetic determinism. Similarly Huxley within his dystopian novel, Brave New World, explores the ramifications of a society that has rejected Mother Nature in all forms and instead is governed by â€Å"controllers†, who dictate how, when and on whom genetic manipulation should be applied, with the overall goal to achieve absolute stability of a toaliatrian state. In this world, Individualism becomes non-existent and a sense of human integrity is eliminated, resulting in complete totalitarian control, in essence â€Å"a pessimistic accounting of the shape a scientifically planned community would take, of its sterility and human emptiness† [4]. One of the most crucial ethical concerns is the dilemma of genetic discrimination against those who are genetically unenhanced. Genetic engineering in humans implies that we can create an elite race of human beings which are superior to the common man or control genetic engineering in such a way as to create groups of altered beings each with predetermined roles in society. Arguably this gives rise to significant ethical concerns, especially in areas of reproduction where parents can alter the genetic makeup of an embryo before birth. While this is seen as an advantage in the scope of eliminating genes coding for certain diseases, it suggests a violation of humanitarian rights and discrimination between those who can afford the technology and those who cannot so that â€Å"a large fraction of human beings will be the victims of the omissions and commissions of science because they lack the material wealth and the social power to control their own lives† [1], as stated by evolutionary geneticist Richard Lewontin. Arguably this will differentiate people in the matter of career advancement and social relationships [3]. This is a prominent concept in Gattaca, as the protagonist despite being a suitable candidate for a job position is discriminated due to his unenhanced form, stating that in a world of genetic determinism â€Å"the best test score in the world wasn’t going to matter unless I had the blood test to go with it† [1]. As well as this, genetic enhancement challenges the concept of virtue ethics. If we have the power to combine all desirable traits together to enhance and elevate ourselves above other individuals, is it morally permissible to do so and will this lead to greater vanity and commercialism in mankind? Additionally how does this affect our relationship with others who either oppose the technology or cannot afford the luxury of such enhancement? Furthermore, genetic engineering in humans alludes to the development of new class structure within society which will widen the gap between the enhanced and unenhanced even further, questioning the right of all individuals to an equal quality of life. Discrimination of individuals has always been a universal predominant concern and significant measures are taken to protect the rights and welfare of citizens in society. Modern society in particular supports and appreciates the significance of egalitarianism. This has not been an easy venture for mankind as history shows us that previous class structures were difficult to dissolve and even today are not extinct. With genetic engineering and genetic discrimination however, the argument emerges that although we have made it illegal to discriminate people on the basis of race, religion and sex, by genetically engineering them we give rise to a new form of discrimination, one not so easily detectable, as Vincent in Gattaca states â€Å"it’s illegal to discriminate on the basis of genetics—genoism it’s called—but no one takes the laws seriously† [1]. These concerns are mirrored in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, where he demonstrates the stringent societal class order where Individuals are predetermined to be alpha, beta, gamma, delta or epsilons and are thus classified in the societal ladder as such. Each class has different genetic traits so to ensure they can carry out their predetermined role in society and are conditioned to enjoy their fate. Huxley presents such a blatant view of genetic discrimination to highlight the complete loss of individuals’ rights, free thinking and the ineffectiveness of those in power to carry out their duties to the public. The major ethical dilemma extends from the concept of utilitarianism, in which certain individuals have taken it upon themselves to control what all aspects of life for the â€Å"greater good of society†. This abolishes all concepts of virtue ethics as in a state of totalitarianism, individuals are discriminated against before they are born and have a chance to prove their worth, as Huxley demonstrates with the lower classes of society, who through gene manipulation are genetically stunted to ensure they will forever remain at the bottom rung of society. The prominence of genetic discrimination as one of the key ethical concerns in these texts highlights the fact that our societal problems are so universal that regardless of how or in which way society changes, the ethical implications of classism will inherently be the same although inflicted in a new form. Therefore a mechanism to sustain egalitarianism in society and retain the rights and freedom of individuals must be developed before we allow genetic engineering to become a stronghold in society, as although we may be advancing forward technologically, ethically we will be taking a step backwards. Additionally, genetic engineering in humans raises the profound ethical concern of losing one’s individuality in a genetically altered world and by extension losing moral autonomy. Genetically altered individuals would see themselves as a product of the deliberate intervention of others, giving rise to the misconception of self integrity. This ethical issue causes raises concerns of homogenous societies, which would violate the engineer’s Code of Ethics to â€Å"support and encourage diversity† [8]. This notion is explored extensively in Brave New World, which abolishes the importance of individualism and demonstrates the ways in which those who have access to gene altering technology can utilise it unethically for their own benefit. As a result we must question not only our self integrity but also who should be responsible for determining what traits can be modified. Here the ethical concern stems from the argument that those with the knowledge to implement the technology may reject the previous moral doctrines and create their own, based on their perception of moral relativism [5]. Huxley supports the view that individuals of a utilitarian predisposition will govern the world believing it is done for the â€Å"greater good of humanity†. Additionally, from the perspective of rights ethics, individuals in this world â€Å"†¦are refused any opportunity to plan their own property, change their role, rank or employment in society. Or even live permanently with another person of their choice† [4], thus rendering the rights of the individual non-existent. Additionally the government enforces strict utilitarian ideology, as it â€Å"believes that stability can be achieved if people think and look the same† [4]; and in doing so, these control agents fail to uphold their duties to their citizens, demonstrating a complete lack of respect for human value and dignity. This ethical concern of losing one’s autonomy and individualism is of paramount importance; as different civilisations throughout history have struggled to obtain freedom and a sense of identity. The portrayal of these notions in the mentioned texts, demonstrate that there is no compromise for humanity’s free will and sense of individuality, as this is seen as a basic humanitarian right. As a result, our support or rejection of human genetic engineering will focus on our examination on how this field will impose on our rights as human beings and free thinking individuals. Perhaps the most profound ethical concern regarding genetic engineering is the questioning of what it means to be human and if genetic engineering results in dehumanisation, destroying the concept of humanity as we know it? In a genetically altered world, do we define genetically engineered beings as human if they have no flaws? Such ethical questions challenge our perception of what makes us human and force us to examine whether there is a necessity in genetically altering ourselves if the advantages do not outweigh the possible consequences, as it can be argued that not every scientific advance automatically makes our lives more â€Å"meaningful† [6]. Both Huxley and Niccol examine this profound ethical concern in their texts, providing the conclusion that although we may alter our genetic makeup, we cannot alter the primal, immaterial characteristics of human beings such as our emotional vulnerability. Thus emotional variability, self awareness, will power and human spirit are all subject to human autonomy and while these remain we do not lose our integrity. In essence it is a rejection of the gene determinism ideology as we do not define our individuality on the basis of genetic makeup, since â€Å"there is no gene for the human spirit† [1]. In Gattaca, the essence of humanity is portrayed through the unenhanced Vincent, who overcomes his genetic heritage through shear motivation and will power, demonstrating that these qualities cannot be engineered, emerging instead from an individual’s motivation when confronted with the challenge of a specific context or environment. In this sense it is Vincent’s flaws which fuel his determination and lead to his ultimate success, not his genes. This is contrasted against the genetically enhanced characters, who suffer form the burden of perfection, as Gattaca poses the ethical dilemma that the expectations put upon the genetically enhanced to live up to their genetics are almost as debilitating as the discrimination against the unenhanced [1]. However the individual who has been engineered with no flaws, has nothing to overcome and no apparent need to improve, thus lacking the traits of will power and motivation that Vincent possessed. This is similar to the genetically engineered characters of Bernard and Helmholtz in Brave New World. They are dissatisfied with the limitations their â€Å"stable† society imposes, despite undergoing full conditioning [6]. These examples suggest that individual desires cannot be suppressed with social intervention and although genetic engineering may eliminate imperfections and flaws, it comes at price, which is that of emotional awareness and human spirit. Additionally, the most philosophical ethical concerns arise from a theoretical examination of how genetic engineering may influence the evolutionary process in the future. Genetic manipulation can be seen as a mechanism to aid humanity in adapting to new environmental conditions. Therefore in terms of evolutionary progress, we must question where genetic engineering places us. Are we speeding up the process of evolution or are we simply providing a new form of natural selection, one which is better suited to our technologically advanced context? So that over time, humanity as we know it will become non-existent having made way for the â€Å"superior† genetically enhanced beings. In the future if genetic engineering became widespread in society, will survival be dependent upon the extent and type of our genetic enhancement and if so, who governs these moral â€Å"absolutes†? Although not practical, these are interesting ethical dilemmas to consider. Essentially, we are approaching a point in history where we have the technology and the expertise to alter our genetic makeup in ways which seemed unthinkable even a decade ago [7]. Genetic engineering provides many advantages to human life such as eradicating disease and eliminating undesirable traits, however it also raises serious bioethical concerns such as those examined in Gattaca and Brave New World. We cannot restrict the advancement of science; rather we need to develop moral boundaries so that we can recognize the value of science without devaluing those who it is intended to serve [2]. Flaws in human genetic engineering cannot be undone and thus a serious examination of the possible ethical implications and consequences need to be determined by the scientist and engineers, so that this technology does not have a detrimental impact on future generation. List of References [1] Kirby, D 2000, The New Eugenics in Cinema: Genetic Determinism and Gene Therapy in GATTACA, Science fiction Studies, accessed 3rd October 2013, [2] Gleghorn, M 2001, Putting the Brakes on Human Genetic Engineering: Are We Speeding toward a Brave New World? Probe Ministries, accessed 1st October 2013 [3] D, P 2012, Loss of Privacy and Sense of Self, Desperado Philosophy, accessed 19th October 2013 [4] Gehlhaus, Jr R 1998, Brave New World: The Cost of Stability, Soma Web, accessed 29th September 2013 [5] Brave New World (1932), Literature & Film Search, assessed 12th October 2013, Bottom of F [6] Shakespeare, T 2000, Brave New World II, The Guardian, accessed 2nd October 2013 [7] Epstein, R1999, Ethical Dangers of Genetic Engineering, Institute for World Religions & San Francisco State University, accessed 2nd October 2013 [8] â€Å"Our Code of Ethics†, 2010, Engineer’s Australia, accessed 10th October 2013

Too Many NGO’s, Not Enough Leaders

Non-profit Organizations in our time, has become the blood of every civil society; providing progressive benefits as well as the necessary aids for marginal groups/sectors of society. It would however be infer by the word â€Å"non-profit† that it literally mean, gaining no profit from a particular NGO. Thus, it would be a common problem for these organizations, the funds for their activities, employees’ salary, and trainings. Overview Non-profit organizations based on the research done by the Bridgespan Group (2006), faced the problem of having none if not too little resources to develop a large pool of highly competitive mangers within their organizations. Same study also indicates that over the next decade, an additional of more than double of today’s managers, will be needed by these organizations. One of the key reasons for this deficit would be the continuously increasing number of NGO’s, the retirement of leaders or the disbanding of a leader to seek greener pasture outside their non-profit organization (Bridgespan, 2006). With this in mind, there is a need to resolve this problem for leadership deficit. This paper aims to give suggestive ideas and proposals on how to address the growing need for leaders in NGO’s. Proposed Answer to the Leadership Deficit Publicity should come first. There’s a lot of ways to advertise your company. With this, you are definitely hitting two birds in one stone. First, through advertising, your endeavor and cause would be known to the public and it would be very beneficial since, major sponsors from your country or abroad would be pouring their support on your company. It would also be a good start to partner with media networks (because media has the fastest access to money). Second, is that, you would be able to attract more and more people and volunteers to work for your organization. The more volunteers you have, the lesser the budget for mobilizing labor pool. Bridgespan (2006), agree that though it may sound paradoxical, the presence of â€Å"funders† strengthen the NGO and its leadership demands through its demands that require to be met. Enhance Compensation for NGO Leaders and Executives Although some would find it their ends to reach their full potential in engaging themselves in â€Å"philanthropic† activities, it would not be denied that even these people has the economic needs, necessary for them and their families to survive. Leaders of the NGO would be much motivated if they think that their efforts and mental investments in the company are well compensated (Bridgestar, 2006). Invest within the people of your organization There is always an objective measure to quantify efficiency. Begin, by pointing out who among the junior employees in your NGO, have the capacity for hard work, mental alertness, loyalty and the necessary qualities such as greater sense of responsibility. Invest in them. Those in their senior years and are about to retire, should worked hands-on with their volunteers and juniors. Try to impart to them the knowledge that you have long held to remain the executive of your organization. Investing in these young people is cheaper and gradual than recruiting from the outside. Whenever, potential leaders are already identified, start by imparting them a higher level executive strategies through training and development. The training strategy should be feasible, cheaper and would instill the value of â€Å"continuity† among the set of leaders. Also, discuss the trend in the leadership deficit to these new potential leaders and asked their opinions and suggestions about it. Provide Intergenerational Discussion By this, it means a link between the senior (baby boomers) and the future junior leaders. A discussion on the aspirations, the rewarding milieu, hindrances to loyalty within an NGO and difficulties among these future leaders, would give an insightful bird’s-eye view on what generation gap means and how to address this hindrance. A good background on the subjects mentioned above would be the basis for creating a better framework for recruitment, training and providing increased compensation and other benefits. Senior leaders should always recognize the difference in technology they have handled before compared to these new junior potential leaders and the importance of giving the latter the right improvement for their creativity, growth and development, and fulfillment as prospective leaders of the company (NCNA, 2007). A greater Plan for the New Batches of Leaders More often than not, being a leader in an NGO neither confines anyone to the four walls of the organization, nor requires anyone to devote his/her life working for the organization. With this, it should not be overlooked, that at a more personal level, leaders tend to have their social activities outside the organization. Forming a girls club, for instance is another role a leader may play. In this manner, NGO’s should male use of this event as an advantage not otherwise. For instance, a party or a training involving their organization may farther contribute to higher employees’ satisfaction and may open venue for new prospective leaders, if not loyal employees of the organization (The Cancer Council, 2007). Given all the proposed alternatives above, NGO should reconsider the strategies that they have employed in their organizations. Above all things, for these company to realize the latter propositions, there is a must to strengthen their instability through increasing their sponsors and funds; with this all other would be a lot easier and faster. References Girls Night In. (2007). The Cancer Council NSW. Retrieved, January 22, 2008 Leadership Matters. (2006). Bridgestar.org. Retrieved, January 23, 2008, from https://www.bridgestar.org/Resources/Newsletters/2006/March2006.aspx Tierney Thomas. (2006). The Non-Profit Sector’s Budget Deficit. The Bridgespan Group. Retrieved, January 22, 2008, from http://www.bridgespangroup.org/PDF/LeadershipDeficitWhitePaper.pdf                           

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"engaging" your employees on the implementation of a Essay

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Developing the Professional - Coursework Example Reference List 15 Appendices 17 Appendix A 17 Appendix B 18 Skills and Character Audit In this essay, I will shed light on my personal skill set and try to create a framework with which I can develop my existing skill level up to a greater extent. This document will also try to analyze my character and skill set that I developed during Masters Programme. After auditing my present skill set, I will conduct a personal SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) in order to identify critical skill areas which I need to improve in order to ensure my academic and professional development. Before going to the discussion about my skill level, I will try to shed light on the question that why personal skill development is an essential part for a management professional or for a student pursuing management course? Wilson (2009) pointed out that students in the management course should be encouraged to write reflective essays and such reflective writing helps them to identify their skill gaps. Ertmer and Newby (1996, p. 18) defined importance of reflective skill auditing as â€Å"reflection is critical for transforming the knowledge gained in and on action into knowledge available for action.† ... halyi (1996) and Maani and Maharaj (2004) defined intellectual skills as the combination of linear thinking approaches such as empirical testing, analytic thinking, imagination and visualization, creativity, intuition, holistic evaluation and emotional intelligence. However, I cannot boast myself for having all the above mentioned linear intellectual skill sets but I believe that at present, I am complemented with certain level of intellectual skills. Losada and Heaphy (2004) and Vance et al. (2007) stressed on the fact that modern managers use non-linear dynamic pattern of intellectual thinking in order to solve complex business problems. Hence, it is evident from the discussion that developing intellectual skill plays vital role for a modern day managers. In such context, auditing my intellectual skill set will definitely help me to judge whether I am competent enough to handle corporate world challenge or not? Intellectual (thinking) skills Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly D isagree 1. I am a creative person who can adapt my thinking to circumstances 2. I am able to organise my thoughts, analyse, synthesise and critically appraise situations 3. I can identify assumptions, evaluate statements in terms of evidence, detect false logic or reasoning, identify implicit values, define terms adequately and generalise appropriately The first skill set is identifying my capability of being flexible and creative enough to adapt to the situational demand. I believe that my instinct works in well balance manner when it comes to being creative or develop new thinking. For example, during my MSc program in Management from University of Glamorgan, I got the opportunity to showcase my creative when it comes to preparing project with team members or solving a business case study

History Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

History - Essay Example The movement received wide level of recognition and support among the urban youths and the marginalised urban poor. In the same way, supporters of the movement included diverse grassroots organizations from the rural areas and provincial cities, peasant organizations, civic, political and economic networks, and professional cadres. The proponents of the movement also aimed at dismantling dictatorship and building â€Å"a democratic state that prioritised the demands of the excluded and exploited majority and their full participation in deciding the agenda of their communities and of the nation† (Dupuy 91). A critical evaluation of the movement convinces one that the legacy of Haiti’s revolution has had great influence on the objectives, as well as outcome, of the Lavalas movement and this calls for the need to unearth the influences of Haitian revolution on the Lavalas movement. The Haitian Revolution has often been regarded as the most successful rebellion initiated by the slaves in 1791that culminated in the abolition of slavery and French domination. In fact, the revolutionaries were influenced by the French revolution itself and fought for equality, fraternity and liberty. Even though, the Haiti revolution was proved to be successful, poverty, were political and economic instability haunted the nation.

Health and Wellness for Children Essay Example for Free

Health and Wellness for Children Essay The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states that the financial cost of childhood obesity tips the scale at 3 billion dollars annually. Children of all ages need to engage in at least 60 minutes of physical activity on a daily basis and become informed about proper nutrition benefits with the support of their parents. Physical education, provided from school, is an ideal way to encourage activity and develop fitness among children and, for many children, will be their only preparation for an active lifestyle. For this reason, the CDC, the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (NASPE), and the American Heart Association all recommend comprehensive daily physical education for children K-12. Obesity itself is a problem, but it also contributes to many other health issues. The obese children of this country are now at risk for many other diseases such as diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol, cardiovascular problems, and may become obese adults if the problem is not managed. According to the Surgeon General Report (2010) over weight adolescents have a 70% chance of becoming overweight or obese adults; which then puts them at risk for a number of health problems including heart disease, type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, and some forms of cancer. The Surgeon General Report (2010) also states that children perceived as overweight suffer from social discrimination, meaning they have poor self-esteem and depression. A solution to keep children from becoming overweight, obese, or to reduce obesity is to generate a before or after school exercise program including nutrition information. Parents need to become involved as well. Children should be assigned 60 minutes of physical activity and a nutrition information sheet for homework every day. A binder must be developed so the parents and children can log their activity and keep track of their nutrition information. To help keep the children and parents interested and knowledgeable about exercise and nutrition the schools can hold a before or after school sessions for parents and children to attend if the they would feel more comfortable being instructed versus on their own. Families can either plan at home activities to meet the  requirements, or attend the school’s program where they will have a safe environment to exercise. The CDC (2010) recommends giving a child a safe environment in which they can play actively and be encouraged to swim, bike, skate, and play sports. Physical activity before or after school should provide opportunities for all students, including those with disabilities, to practice what theyve learned in physical education, work towards the nationally recommended 60+ minutes of daily moderate-vigorous physical activity, and prepare the brain for learning. Additional benefits include social interaction and engagement of students in safe, supervised activities. The Department of Health and Human Services (2008) recommend that children’s activity time include moderate to vigorous aerobic activity, muscle strengthening, and bone-strengthening exercises, and that young people should be encouraged to participate in age-appropriate, enjoyable, and diverse activities. There are many examples of physical activity, including not only team sports but also walking, biking, swimming, hiking, dancing, gardening, and many other group or individual activities. Recreational activities enjoyable to youth help ensure that they continue to engage in those activities. Outdoor activities can be enjoyed in a variety of locations and are often less expensive, more accessible, and can foster life-long activity. To accommodate all children’s needs and desires for physical activity the school can link their activities with the other local programs at various locations such as the YMCA, girls/boys scouts, boys and girls clubs, etc†¦ The children will gain a self-motivation to become a healthy life-long active individual. This program can reduce the rates of overweight and obese children around the world. Much of the world has become sedentary due to new technologies and the busyness of the world. The program will help children learn the importance of physical activity and help them feel and act more energetic. They will start to learn and implement a healthy lifestyle that they will be able to carry on to adulthood. The persons who implement and agree upon this program will help to keep children safe and will benefit from assisting them to improve their lifestyles and help prevent and reduce obesity. The program will be successful because it will allow the overweight and obese children to be more active which can help aide in weight loss. By teaching them these behaviors all through their school age they will learn the behaviors and hopefully prevent obesity as an adult and all the other associated health problems. The Surgeon General Report (2010) says that it is recommended for Americans to accumulate at least 60 minutes of moderate physical activity most days of the week for children, and even greater amounts may be necessary for the prevention of weight gain, for weight loss, or sustaining weight loss. Many schools do not have the funds to support a physical education program. There are numerous grants that provide funds to schools in need of these programs. Many of the organizations are non-profit groups while others are run by the state or federal government. Some of the grants are: Carol M. White Physical Education Program, PTA Healthy Lifestyles, Funds for Fuel Up to Play 60, and ING Run For Something Better School Awards Program. Aside from grants schools can also advertise for professional volunteers to help assist with exercise and nutrition classes held before or after school to educate the children and parents. As childhood obesity rates climb, attention is being directed towards school lunches as a possible solution to the problem. Even if children are provided vegetables and fruits, many children won’t eat them unless they’ve been over-steamed, which drains nutrients, and many fruits are in sugary syrups. The healthy options given at lunch time can’t simply be forced onto the children’s plates because it will just end up in the garbage. But that’s where the nutrition education portion comes in. Teaching children about the dangers of being overweight and being afflicted with childhood obesity, and letting them come to terms with it if they are, is an essential step in the right direction. Changing the school lunches and the vending machines to healthier foods will help in reducing obesity, but these overweight and obese children need more than just a healthy option for lunch and a snack. They need lifestyle changes that carry on to adulthood which includes education on how to choose the right foods for breakfast, lunch, snack, and dinner as well as participating in physical activity on a daily basis. Children should have several opportunities to be active throughout the week and year round. Activity should be a normal part of a child’s day, from walking or biking to and from school, where appropriate, to participating in a physical education class, to engaging in active games during recess, after school, or in the summer at home, in a park, or on a playground. All children benefit and gain enjoyment from physical activity, regardless of ability or disability status, gender, or athletic inclinations and talents. The benefits of physical activity extend beyond childhood too young people who grow up physically active more likely to be active adults. Likewise, young people who feel supported by friends and families or are surrounded by others interested in physical activity are more likely to participate in both structured and non-structured activities. These social areas are powerful in determining children’s actions.

Particular social system Essay Example for Free

Particular social system Essay Ethics is the discipline that deals with the good and the bad as well as with the moral duty and responsibility of an individual. It can also be defined as the study of the choices made by individuals as regards right and wrong (Marie, 2005). Ethics is mainly concerned with the philosophy that results in a particular behavior. Ethics are of different types, and they differ in terms of their application in different contexts. Ethics state the working of a particular social system. They point towards the utilization of morality. At birth, as indicated by Be The Dream (2009), everyone is practically a blank slate. The period of infancy is characterized by total emptiness. The only skill an infant is equipped with is crying in order to attract the attention of the other people. Infants are contented with just lying watching the world revolve around them until they need something. However, as life progresses, individuals develop values in accordance with what they have previously learned or gone through (Be The Dream, 2009). The main intent of developing ethics is to set up the capacity to come up with rational judgment and ethical decisions. The whole process of personal ethics development is continuous and goes on through out life (Marie, 2005). Personal ethics, morals and values go hand in hand. Values are beneficial aspects learned from childhood, either as a result of interaction with the environment or from parents. Morals are the inherent beliefs that develop from the values system of the way an individual should react in a particular situation (Fairleigh Dickinson University, 2010). Ethics, on the other hand, are characterized by an individual’s reaction to difficult situations. Ethics play a major role of testing the morals of an individual. Personal ethics are instilled by the culture, environment as well as the background in which an individual is brought up (Fairleigh Dickinson University, 2010). Family values in addition to traditional values are very important in the upbringing of a child. These values play a major role in assisting an individual develop personal ethics at a very tender age. Various personal ethics include: honesty, loyalty, punctuality, open-mindedness, self respect as well as respect for others and fairness (Marie, 2005). Hatcher (2007) states that the expression of one’s ethics is not always comprehended in the global context at large, immediate surrounding, or even among the closest family members. This is mainly as a result of the difference in the development of personal ethics. Personal ethics develop early in life through interaction with family, church, school, and other members of the general community. All these people play part in helping one mold his/her beliefs (Hatcher, 2007). Personal ethics are established through unconscious observations as well as experiences of childhood. Personal ethics narrate values that help an individual make sense of his/her life. They enable one to make moral decisions that are not inclined towards the good of an individual but to all people. An ethical person undergoes extensive internal battles, trying to figure out whether his or her actions will negatively impact on others. Personal ethics enable individuals to make decisions that are meant for the benefit of all. They act as an innate factor that enable individuals make rational and morally correct decisions (Hatcher, 2007).

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process. Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process.